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By "brain drain" I mean the emigration of skilled persons from poor
countries to rich countries.1 Traditionally, many have seen the brain
drain as a curse for developing countries. Brain drain is bad, they think,
because it hurts those left behind. Governments of developing countries
promote this view as well, arguing that because "human capital" is an
* Tobias Simon Eminent Scholar, Florida State University College of Law. I
thank the participants in the San Diego Conference on National Borders and Immigration,
April 2008, for their useful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to Matt
Zwolinski.
1. There is, of course, an important migration of skilled workers among rich
countries. In this Article, however, I only address the brain drain from poor countries.
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important determinant of economic growth, the loss of skilled individuals
undermines the economic performance of the country.2 As one researcher
puts it, "[t]he brain drain increases the scarcity of highly needed skilled
labour in developing countries and consequently reduces long-ran economic
growth and income."3 Taking this empirical claim as obviously true,
many deplore the brain drain as somehow unfair, and suggest that
something ought to be done to stem it.4 Yet, to my knowledge, there has
been no normative treatment of brain drain. The literature on global
justice, usually favorable to freer migration, has kept silent on the issue.5
This Article argues against this conventional view. Most of the time
there is nothing unfair about the brain drain, whether one considers it
from the standpoint of the emigrant, the source country, or the host
country. Critics of the brain drain make problematic empirical and
philosophical claims. The empirical assumption of the critics, that the
brain drain invariably hurts developing countries, is controversial. While a
number of authorities endorse the conventional view that the brain drain
hurts source countries, a contrarian literature suggests that the brain
drain may help those left behind-that there is, in fact, a brain gain.
Moreover, the philosophical claim that societies in some sense own
individuals' natural talents ought to be rejected.
This Article first examines the facts and summarizes various proposals
that have been advanced to stem the brain drain. The evidence shows
that (1) it is far from clear that the brain drain harms those left behind;
(2) even if those left behind are harmed, that harm is far from devastating;
and (3) because the brain drain allocates resources efficiently, it is likely
to benefit many people globally, especially the world's poor. For the
sake of argument, this Article then concedes that the source country is
harmed in some relevant sense, and asks whether this harm is unjust.
2. South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki asks rhetorically: "[D]o we not
have need to recall Africa's hundreds of thousands of intellectuals back from their places
of emigration in Western Europe and North America, to rejoin those who remain still
within our shores!" Thabo Mbeki, The African Renaissance Statement of Deputy
President, Thabo Mbeki, SABC, Gallagher Estate 27 (Aug. 13, 1998), http://www.
dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbekO8l3.htm.
3. Research Group on the Global Future, Center for Applied Policy Research,
Brain Drain 1 (July 20, 2005), http://www.cap-hmu.de/fgz/statistics/brain-drain.php
[hereinafter CAP Report].
4. See infra text accompanying notes 21-23.
5. Allen Buchanan, for example, recommends that the international community
should support "efforts to liberalize immigration policies to increase economic
opportunities for the world's worst off .... " ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY,
AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (2004).
Similarly, Moellendorf criticizes, on the grounds of justice, current immigration restrictions in
developed countries, but does not mention the brain drain. DARREL MOELLENDORF,
COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE 54, 6147 (2002).
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After examining at some length the concept of self-ownership, this
Article endorses the concept and discusses its relevance to the brain
drain. Even assuming that those left behind are harmed in some sense
by talented citizens who leave, the state has no claim over the skilled
individual who emigrates because he has pre-political ownership of his
talents. This Article then examines the argument that the talented citizen
has a duty of reciprocity to the citizen's home country, and finds it
wanting. Finally, the Article rejects the twin views that emigrants, in
most cases, act wrongly when they leave, and that host countries act
wrongly when they attract skilled immigrants. The upshot is that if the
brain drain harms others, it is not an unfair harm.
I. THE FACTS
International migration of talent has increased substantially since the
Second World War.6  A 2005 statistical study of selected countries shows
that emigration of talent surpasses fifty percent in some countries.
7
Although scholars disagree about the extent of the phenomenon, no one
seriously denies that it is happening. And no one seriously denies that
the brain drain occurs mostly, but by no means only, from poor to rich
countries. This is the brain drain that raises ethical concerns, because
unlike most rich countries, poor countries urgently need scientists and
doctors. A German doctor who leaves for the United States presumably
does not hurt Germany much; a doctor from Ghana who makes the
decision to emigrate is likely, it is thought, to hurt his home country.8
6. According to a 1984 report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), around 400,000 skilled individuals migrated from developing
to developed countries between 1961 and 1972. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
Proposals on Concrete Measures to Mitigate the Adverse Impact of Reverse Transfer of
Technology on Developing Countries, 25, U.N. Doc TD/B/AC.35/6 (July 20, 1984).
7. See CAP Report, supra note 3. In some cases, the percentage of skilled
population that emigrates is staggering: 82.5% of Jamaicans with tertiary education live
in OECD countries. DEVESH KAPUR & JOHN MCHALE, GIVE Us YOUR BEST AND
BRIGHTEST: THE GLOBAL HUNT FOR TALENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DEVELOPING WORLD
18 (2005). There are some surprises, though; not all source countries are developing
countries. New Zealand and Italy experience high brain drain, while the brain drain from
Italy and Russia exceeds the brain drain from Mexico and Thailand. See CAP Report,
supra note 3. The emigration rates for skilled workers by region are 41% for the
Caribbean region, 27% for Western Africa, 18.4% for Eastern Africa, and 16% for
Central America. See KAPuR & McHALE, supra, at 1.
8. Although, for noncosmopolitans who think persons owe a strong duty to
compatriots, it would not matter if those left behind were citizens of a rich country.
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The causes of brain drain are not hard to fathom. On the demand side,
the explosion of knowledge-based industries in rich countries has
increased the need for skilled workers in those countries. This in turn
creates the wage differentials that attract educated immigrants. On the
supply side, poor salaries and deficient working and political conditions
in developing nations increase the incentives to leave. The expected
benefits for the emigrant compensate for the considerable costs of
emigration. Yet these benefits are not only financial: Brains go where
other brains are, where they can face challenges. 9 Brain drain, then, is
explained by a properly enriched application of two well-established
economic laws: the law of labor supply and demand, and the law of
comparative advantages.
As previously indicated, the traditional view is that the brain drain
hurts the source country. In a classic treatment, the noted economist
Jagdish Bhagwati took this harm for granted when he proposed taxing
the foreign-earned income of the migrant. 10 There is a large amount of
literature echoing this sentiment,11 which has found its way to the informed
press. 12 The general thrust of the traditional view is that emigration of
human capital is detrimental to economic growth. Under this view, poor
countries that see their talented citizens leave are likely to remain
trapped in poverty, in part because good institutions are crucial for
economic and political success, and educated citizens are the more likely
institution-builders, so if they leave, the country never has a chance to
take off.13 Critics of the brain drain conclude that because the benefits
of education are externalities that individuals do not take into account
when making private decisions, "policies to curb the brain drain may be
warranted. ' 14
This traditional view has been challenged by a number of scholars. 15
According to them, allowing emigration of talented persons raises the
9. This was observed more than forty years ago. See Philip H. Abelson, Editorial,
New Centers of Excellence, 150 SCIENCE 11, 11 (1965).
10. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Brain Drain Tax Proposal and the Issues, in TAXING
THE BRAIN DRAIN 3, 3 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Martin Partington eds., 1976).
11. See generally the survey in Jagdish N. Bhagwati & John Douglas Wilson,
Income Taxation in the Presence of International Personal Mobility: An Overview, in
INCOME TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY 3, 7-8, 13, 17 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati &
John Douglas Wilson eds., 1989).
12. See Go for It, ECONOMIST, May 6, 2000, at 20.
13. See KAPUR & McHALE, supra note 7, at 5-6.
14. William J. Carrington & Enrica Detragiache, How Extensive is the Brain
Drain?, FIN.& DEV., June 1999, at 46, 49.
15. See Andrew Mountford, Can a Brain Drain Be Good for Growth in the Source
Economy?, 53 J. DEV. ECON. 287, 287-88 (1997); Oded Stark, Rethinking the Brain
Drain, 32 WORLD DEV. 15, 16 (2004); Jean-Pierre Vidal, The Effect of Emigration on
Human CapitalFormation, 11 J. POPULATION EcON. 589, 589-90 (1998).
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returns on education. 16 In other words, if people have a non-negligible
probability that by investing in education they may migrate to another
country where salaries are higher, they will predictably invest in their
education. The possibility of brain drain, then, creates an incentive for
more education, and this benefits the country, assuming that only some
of those persons will in fact emigrate. Compared to a closed economy,
"an economy open to migration differs not only in the opportunities that
workers face but also in the structure of the incentives they confront;
higher prospective returns [to education] in a foreign country impinge on
[education] decisions at home. 17 Even conceding that the country may
experience some loss, this "brain gain"-defined as the increased
investment in education in the source country-must be computed to
calculate the effect of migration, and the brain gain may exceed the brain
drain. To these gains one must add the "brain circulation," that is, those
persons who return to their home countries after studying or working
abroad. Although these findings have been disputed,18 they are weighty
enough to cast doubt on the view that the harm to source countries is as
devastating or univocal as had been earlier assumed. 19
A couple caveats about the economic literature are in order. First, the
formal analyses offered, although indispensable, assume that the wage
differential is the only relevant incentive to emigrate. In reality, immigration
has many other costs and benefits. In terms of costs, the emigrant leaves
his culture and his family, perhaps to go to a place where he will not
speak the language or will feel otherwise alienated or isolated. In terms
of benefits, as I indicated, he may be seeking values other than money,
such as intellectual and scientific challenges. Second, the whole brain
16. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 15, at 19 (asserting that low probability of
migration motivates individuals to underinvest in human capital); Vidal, supra note 15,
at 596-97 (arguing that labor migration provides incentive for human capital formation
in the source country).
17. Stark, supra note 15, at 16. The brain gain hypothesis has been recently
endorsed by a United Nations study. See UN News Centre, UN Report, Brain Drain Can
Also Be Brain Gain for Some Source Countries (Apr. 18, 2008), http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26338&Cr=unu&Crl. The study does recognize that in
some areas such as health care brain drain remains a concern.
18. See Maurice Schiff, Brain Gain: Claims About its Size and Impact on Welfare
and Growth are Greatly Exaggerated, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, REMITTANCES,
AND THE BRAIN DRAIN 201,201-24 (Caglar Ozden & Maurice Schiff eds., 2006).
19. The variables are many: Even proponents of the traditional view make
distinctions between different types of countries. Kapur and McHale suggest that the
brain drain will affect medium-sized countries more than small countries. KAPuR &
McHALE, supra note 7, at 178-79.
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drain versus brain gain debate is about whether the brain drain hurts the
source country. Yet any normative assessment of the brain drain should
take into account its effect on everyone, and in particular the world's
poor. This variable is not addressed in the brain drain literature, which
focuses on the harm to the source country. Although the effect of the
brain drain on the global population-that is, whether or not the brain
drain helps everyone in the aggregate-is difficult to establish, there is
no suggestion in the literature to dispute the conjecture that if talents are
put to their best and highest uses, they will end up benefitting a larger
number of people. This is not hard to accept in the aggregate, although
it may or may not be true in a particular case. A scientist who is poorly
paid and lacks laboratories and qualified assistants is less likely to
contribute beneficial knowledge than a scientist who works under
favorable conditions. On the other hand, a doctor who practices in
poor, rural areas in a developing country seems to be helping deserving
persons more than a doctor who treats millionaires in the Mayo Clinic,
20even though his services are arguably put to their best and highest use.
II. PROPOSALS TO STEM THE BRAIN DRAIN
Those who criticize the brain drain have proposed several measures to
curb it. These proposals can be grouped into three categories: measures
adopted by source states, measures adopted by receiving states, and
measures adopted through international cooperation. 21 In turn, the source
country may use the "stick" and enact measures of control, or use the
"carrot" and enact measures to increase the incentives to stay. The most
obvious control measure is the exit visa, which subjects emigration to the
government's permission. This is now discredited for obvious reasons,
although some would accept exit visas in extreme cases, for example, to
prevent emigration of doctors and nurses during a serious epidemic.
Only slightly less objectionable are proposals to forcibly delay emigration,
for example, by adding years to medical training.22 The country may
also enact fiscal controls. The government can tax the foreign-earned
income of the emigrant, or establish financial burdens such as an exit
tax. These measures raise the cost of emigration. Source states may
also try to address the causes of the brain drain by creating incentives to
stay, such as improving salaries and working conditions and, more
20. I say seems because even this cannot be said with certainty. What if the Mayo
Clinic patient is a great economist or scientist who, if cured, will help rescue millions of
persons from poverty?
21. Here, I generally follow KAPUR &McHALE, supra note 7, at 177-209.
22. See, e.g., Gumisai Mutume, Reversing Africa's 'Brain Drain', AFRICA RECOVERY,
July 2003, at 18.
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importantly, by pursuing economic and social policies that bring progress,
freedom, and prosperity to their society, thus eliminating the causes of
the brain drain. Finally, the source state may adopt measures to strengthen
its relationship with the diaspora of talented nationals, thus softening the
adverse impact of the brain drain.
Receiving countries may discontinue immigration policies that lure
talented immigrants, either by changing welcoming immigration laws or
by refraining from direct recruitment of skilled persons in poor countries.
Thus, for example, the federally-funded Fulbright Scholarship program
requires foreign graduates to return to their home countries. 2  Finally,
poor and rich countries may agree, by treaty, for example, that the rich
country will compensate the poor country for the brain drain.
III. THE STATE AND THE EMIGRANT
There are several ways to evaluate the facts and proposals related to
brain drain. One could take an economic approach and say that the brain
drain simply allocates human resources efficiently in that brain drain
puts talents to their best and highest use. 24 Because skilled workers
migrate where their talents are most wanted and rewarded, the total
output is maximized, at least when the effect of the brain drain is
considered in the aggregate. Under this view, asking whether the brain
drain is fair is like asking whether the fact that Americans buy Japanese
DVD players is fair. Seen from this perspective, liberals should not be
opposed to the phenomenon either. The brain drain is a free exchange
across borders, like free trade: The immigrant seeks employment and the
foreign employer takes the immigrant as an employee. Only a police
state tells persons that they should work here or there. Scientists, doctors,
and teachers should be free to seek employment wherever and whenever
they want.
But of course, the question is not so simple. An efficient outcome
may be unfair. Perhaps citizens who consider leaving should pause;
perhaps emigrating violates duties owed to fellow citizens. Some
may even suggest that the government, acting on behalf of the citizenry,
23. It is not clear if the purpose of this provision is to help poor countries or to
curb immigration.
24. For a defense of liberal immigration laws-and not just brain drain-along
these lines, see Alan 0. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A
Theoretical Survey with an Analysis of U.S. Policy, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 158,
158-59 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995).
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has the power to enforce such duties and make emigration difficult or
impossible. Just as the government, it is thought, has the power to
enforce our duties toward others by redistributing wealth through taxes,
so the government can legitimately induce the wayward sheep to stay in
the herd. Finally, it might be argued that rich countries are wrong to
actively entice educated immigrants, whether by enacting welcoming
immigration laws or by aggressively recruiting foreign talent.25 In so
doing, it might be thought that rich countries are unduly preying on an
important resource that developing countries need to grow in the long
run.
This Article rejects the common approach of treating talented persons
as the human capital of the state.26 This language suggests that talented
persons are a resource of the state, so that the state should be able to
regulate how many should emigrate or stay in the country. Such an
approach unduly personifies the state as the owner of human capital, just
as an investor owns his money, and therefore fails to treat persons as
autonomous agents. Any liberal theory should give weight to individual
choices, and the issue should be whether those individual choices-the
decisions to leave-are open to moral criticism. Any political measure
to address the brain drain should cohere with the pride of place that a
liberal polity assigns to individual freedom.
Accordingly, few disagree that citizens have, in principle, a right to
leave their country.27 Indeed, requiring exit visas, or subjecting emigration
to the government's permission, is the mark of many past and present
oppressive regimes. 28 Although exit visas have sometimes been defended,
that position is mercifully discredited today, and preventing people from
leaving their own country is a violation of international law. 29 A major
purpose of the right of exit is to allow citizens to choose among different
25. A well-known example is the United Kingdom's aggressive recruitment of
Filipino nurses. For an overview, see Cm. ON MIGRATION, POLICY, & SOCIETY, INVESTIGATING
THE IMPACT OF HEALTH CARE RECRUITMENT FROM THE PHILIPPINES (2006), http://www.
compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/Briefmgs/Briefmg-1206-Philippines.pdf
26. For the seminal paper on the importance of human capital, see Robert E.
Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3, 17,
35 (1988).
27. Thus, John Rawls says that a well-ordered society must recognize the right of
emigration as a human right. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 74 (1999).
28. See R. Adam Moody, Reexamining Brain Drain from the Former Soviet
Union, 3 THE NONROLIFERATION REVIEW 92, 92 (1996), available at http://cns.miis.
edu/pubs/npr/vo103/33/moody33.pdf Interestingly, Soviet bloc regimes gave brain drain
as their reason to control all immigration. In Cuba, for example, the regime routinely
denies exit visas to health care professionals. E.g., Denial Exit Visas a Health Care
Professionals in Cuba, MEDICINA CUBANA, Nov. 17, 2006, http://medicinacubana.
blogspot.com/2006/1 1/denial-exit-visas-health-care.html.
29. E.g., G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 12(2), U.N. Doc. A/6546 (Dec. 16, 1966).
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cultures, institutions, and legal systems. The right of exit is important
for those who think that global justice should make room for various
conceptions of the good, even some that are presumably decent but do
not conform to liberal principles.30
Once the right of exit is accepted, it is tempting to say that this settles
the issue of brain drain: The emigrant would simply be exercising his
right to exit and the state has no legitimate power to stop him. However,
this conclusion would be too quick, because although it might be true
that the state cannot legitimately force the emigrant to stay, the state may
perhaps raise the cost of leaving. If the brain drain is bad and something
ought to be done about it-even though that something cannot be forcing
persons to stay-arguably, state measures short of force that create
incentives to stay are not necessarily objectionable.
Moreover, even conceding that the emigrants have a right to leave,
one could still argue that they ought to stay. Political principles, that is,
principles about the proper role of the state, may tell us that a liberal
state cannot validly prevent someone from leaving. Emigrants may have
a political right to leave, but perhaps they would act immorally if they
did.31 Although the state is barred from keeping them in, it can be argued
that they still owe a moral duty to their fellow citizens to stay.
The preceding paragraphs summarize some of the measures that have
been proposed to stem the brain drain. Some measures-where the state
uses the stick-are measures of control, such as taxation of foreign
income or interstate compensation. The other measures-where the state
uses the carrot-are measures that create incentives for people to stay,
such as facilitating the creation of quality research institutions, providing
various kinds of subsidies and rewards, or strengthening a relationship
with the diaspora. In order to evaluate these sets of arguments-the
argument that the state may legitimately enact carrot or stick policies
short of force to make emigration harder and the argument that the
emigrant is doing something wrong-the moral-political relationship
between the state and its citizens must be discussed.
30. See RAWLS, supra note 27, at 71, 74.
31. Similarly, although I may act immorally in doing so, I have a political right to
offend people in public and the government cannot silence me.
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IV. SELF-OWNERSHIP
A. The Classical View
The critical threshold inquiry is whether a state has a moral claim to
its citizens' talents. According to the classical-liberal tradition, the
answer is no. John Locke famously claimed that "[t]hough the Earth,
and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a
Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.
The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are
properly his. 3 2  Here Locke distinguishes between property in one's
own person and property in external things."3 Because external things,
such as land, were initially owned in common, those who were lucky
enough to appropriate them first owed, perhaps, some compensation to
latecomers. The idea here is that taking something from the commons
worsens the remaining co-owners. Some think that this original duty of
compensation that first appropriators owe to the rest provides a moral
foundation for the distributive state, because it knocks down the first-
appropriation rule as a basis for the right of private property.3 4 Things
were originally owned in common, so when first possessors took external
things from the commons, they could not, given the scarcity of worldly
goods, possibly satisfy the Lockean proviso, that is, leave "enough, and
as good . . . in common for others. 3 5 Therefore, first possessors must
arguably compensate others, and the state is the agent entrusted with
implementing this duty. 6
32. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 185 (The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. 2006) (1690). For modem restatements of the principle of self-ownership, see MICHAEL
OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT INEQUALITY 11-19 (2003); Peter Vallentyne,
Libertarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. § 1 (2006), available at http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism ("At the core of full self-ownership... is full control
self-ownership, the full right to control the use of one's person."). See also ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 171 (1974).
33. See also OTSUKA, supra note 32, at 11-21.
34. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN
INTRODUCTION 116-21 (2d ed. 2002).
35. LOCKE, supra note 32, at 186. Many commentators have argued that the
Lockean proviso cannot possibly be satisfied.
36. I state this position-that because the Lockean proviso cannot be satisfied, the
state has the power to redistribute external goods- arguendo because I have serious
reservations about it. First, from the fact that an original appropriator is not entitled to a
piece of land, it does not follow that others are entitled to it. In other words, why, in the
state of nature, are external resources treated as terra communis and not as terra nulla?
See Fred D. Miller, Jr., The Natural Right to Private Property, in THE LIBERTARIAN
READER 275, 284-85 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 1982). Second, there are strong empirical
reasons to defend private property and first appropriation as creating a strong right to
external things, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. My aim in this
Article is to reject the collective ownership of natural assets. I do this by showing that
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However, individuals did not appropriate their natural assets from the
commons: Those came attached to them. It follows that a person's claim
over himself-his body, his talents, his mind-is stronger than his claim
over external things. If this is true, the state needs an especially strong
justification to appropriate a person's talents-certainly stronger than the
justification it needs to appropriate the external things a person holds.
However, the precise meaning of people owning their own talents is
unclear. That I own an external thing means that I have the right to
exclude others from the use of that thing. The notion of trespass is fairly
clear: If I own my house, you trespass if you occupy my house without
my permission. And, conversely, to suggest that I do not really own my
house means that others, such as the government, may expropriate it or
regulate its use in accordance with the demands of justice. If we think
about money, for example, we can say that I own my income if I can
exclude others from my bank account. Conversely, to say that I do not
really own my income may mean that the government can tax it in
accordance with whatever justified policies the government pursues.37
So, regardless of whether I morally own or do not own my external
things, the meaning of ownership is fairly clear.
Similarly, the meaning of owning my physical person is fairly clear:
Others cannot invade my body, even for the general good. That
someone owns himself means that he should have a primary say over
what may be done to his body because, as Warren Quinn put it, "any
arrangement that denied him that say would be a grave indignity. "38
The government cannot, for example, take my healthy kidney to give it
to someone who needs it more. Most people agree that the right to
exclude others from the use of my body is more stringent than the right
to exclude others from the use of external things such as land. But in
each case, the meaning of ownership is clear because both land and body
are tangible, physical objects. 39
this particular argument for redistribution, even if sound, does not apply to natural assets.
Miller thinks that the objections to collective ownership of talents apply equally to
collective ownership of external goods. Id. at 284-85.
37. In this sense, see LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP:
TAXES AND JUSTICE 9 (2002).
38. WARREN QUINN, MORALITY AND ACTION 170 (1993).
39. Not everyone agrees, however. See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Against Self-
Ownership: There are No Fact-Insensitive Ownership Rights over One's Body, 36 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 86, 117 (2008) (claiming that most of the intuitions that are said to derive
from self-ownership are better explained by other principles).
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But the meaning of self-ownership over talent is not so clear. What
would it be for others to treat, for example, my musical abilities as theirs?
One can imagine the government forcing me to play the guitar in public.
But that necessarily entails actual or threatened physical bodily coercion.
Indeed, any instance one can imagine of others literally appropriating my
talents-for example, the government performing forcible surgery on
my brain to extract my musical talents-involves an egregious invasion
of my body and is thus forbidden by any plausible political theory.
So, to say that I do morally own my talents has to mean something
beyond saying that my body and mind cannot be literally appropriated
by others. What it means, to make sense for a plausible political theory,
is that the government has only a limited power to tax the income
generated by the use of my talents. On the classical view, one may
perhaps say that the government can tax my talent-generated income in
order to produce genuine public goods. But the government cannot tax
me to realize social justice, because others lack any justice-based claim
over my natural assets. Because my talents have come attached to me,
and they are not goods that I have taken from the commons, the income I
generate from them is entirely mine. 40 These personal talents are not
traceable to any violent or otherwise suspect appropriation in the past. If
someone traces the chain of title of the land I own, they may find that at
some point in the past someone stole the land from somebody else. But
no examination of the chain of title of my natural assets will reveal any
blemish. Those assets came with me from the day I was born; I did not
take them away from anyone else.
At this juncture, classical thought bifurcates. The right-wing version
of classical liberalism claims, with Locke, that the material wealth
generated by mixing my natural assets, or my labor, with external things
is also mine .41 The state can only tax me for the production of genuine
public goods, and no more. Under this view, sometimes called right-
libertarianism, self-ownership justifies private property of external
things.42 The left-wing strand of classical liberalism claims that mixing
my labor with external things does not erase the fact that those things
were originally taken from the commons, and the state may therefore tax
me to compensate others. Under this view, sometimes called left-
libertarianism, self-ownership does not justify private property of
40. However, this income may perhaps be subject to the public goods exception.
41. For a presentation of both views, plus the liberal-egalitarian view, see OTSUKA,
supra note 32, at 15-16.
42. The right-libertarian view is well described by Peter Vallentyne:
"Libertarianism holds that agents initially fully own themselves and have moral powers
to acquire property rights in external things under certain conditions." See Vallentyne,
supra note 32, 1.
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external things.43 Notably, both sides agree that persons own themselves;
right and left simply differ on the extent of the claim that society may
have over the external things I hold.
B. The Liberal-Egalitarian View
Liberal egalitarians have challenged the robust notion of self-
ownership that characterizes classical liberalism. As we saw, classic
liberals, right and left, believe that self-ownership entails (1) a strong
right to control one's mind and body that bars others from forcible
intrusion, and (2) a strong right to all the income that one can generate
from one's mind and body, including labor.44 Many liberal egalitarians
agree with some version of (1), but not with (2). They agree with
classical liberals that the state may not invade someone's body or mind
in a manner inconsistent with basic liberty. But liberal egalitarians do
claim that the state can extensively tax people's talent-generated income.
For example, John Rawls has famously argued that a central aim of
justice is to "nullif[y] the accidents of natural endowment," not only
because this is necessary to implement equality, but also because we do
not deserve our talents.45 For Rawls, "the most obvious injustice of the
system of natural liberty [that is, a system where, among other things,
people can use their natural assets as they please] is that it permits
distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so
arbitrary from a moral point of view."46 But Rawls goes further: He also
criticizes what he calls "the liberal conception"; that is, one that improves
upon natural liberty by securing equality of opportunity.47 Rawls argues
that "even if [the liberal conception] works to perfection in eliminating
the influence of social contingencies, it still permits the distribution
of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of
abilities and talents., 48 Rawls then immediately adds that "[t]here is no
more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled
by the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social fortune."4 9
43. For a full exposition of left-libertarianism, see LEFT-LIBERTARIANISM AND ITS
CRITICS: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds., 2000).
44. See OTSUKA, supra note 32, at 15.
45. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15 (1971).
46. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 73.
48. Id. at 73-74.
49. Id. at 74.
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In other parts of the book he is even more explicit: "[T]he difference
principle," for Rawls, "represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the
distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the
benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be., 50 Natural talents
are, indeed, "a collective asset.,
51
The consequence of this view for brain drain is that the emigrant does
not own his talents. His natural assets are part of a common pool that
services others. This obligation may make his decision to leave open
to moral criticism on grounds of justice, even if the state cannot,
consistently with the priority of liberty, force him to stay. Similarly, the
government can enforce that social obligation by taxing the income
generated by the use of his natural assets. Put differently, under this
view, a person is only entitled to whatever income shares are allotted to
him by a theory of justice, and the fact that he does not deserve his
natural assets allows the state to redistribute the income generated by
those natural assets in the way justice requires. The only reason why
society allows a person to keep some of his talent-generated income is
because doing so maintains that person's incentive to remain productive,
and others, especially the poor, are thereby better served. He owns his
talents in the sense that there is no morally permissible way for the state
to literally appropriate them, but he does not own his talents in the
derivative sense that he is entitled to the income generated by their use.
If, by some psychological quirk, people would continue to acquire and
use their talents regardless of how much the state would appropriate the
income thus generated, under the liberal-egalitarian view, the state could
tax one hundred percent of such income in order to implement social
justice.
I have always thought that the view that natural talents are collectively
owned is the most objectionable claim in A Theory of Justice. To be
sure, the claim that the state can tax talent-generated income is not in
itself the most objectionable, because here Rawls generally agrees with
many others. 52 Rather, what should be rejected are the reasons Rawls
gives to justify those policies.
First, it is not true that income distribution influenced by natural talents is
as worrisome as income distribution influenced by social position. For,
as I observed earlier, there is a significant moral gap between my body
and my mind, on one hand, and the estate I have inherited from my rich
parents, on the other. It is much more plausible to say that I morally
own my body than to say that I morally own what I have inherited. The
50. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 179.
52. For the reasons given in the text, this Article rejects this claim as well.
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case for sharing my wealth is more plausible than the case for sharing
my limbs or my thoughts. Correspondingly, the claims that others press
on my material wealth are stronger than the claims that others press on
my natural assets. Arguably at least, I, or someone before me in the chain
of title, took material things from the commons, and fairness requires
that I be willing to give some of that back to others. But I did not take my
natural assets from the commons, and that makes an important difference in
the claims that others have over my person. Rawls wrongly denies this
difference between both kinds of assets.
Second, Rawls thinks that the reason why people should not be able to
generate differential income from their natural talents is that people do
not deserve them. But it is fallacious to say that not deserving X is a
sufficient reason for not being entitled to X. And it is equally fallacious
to suggest "that a person earns Y ... only if he's earned (or otherwise
deserves) whatever he used (including natural assets) in the process of
earning Y." 53 To be sure, we do say that someone owns something because
she deserves it: Someone has earned this award by her work, and so
forth. Deserving something is a sufficient condition for coming to own
it. People should get what they deserve.54 But the concepts of owning
and deserving are not coextensive. If I give you a gift, you may not
deserve it, but my giving it to you surely counts for creating your right
over the gift.
55
This fallacy in Rawls's argument is especially glaring when applied to
natural assets. My limbs, my keen or deficient eyesight, my modest or
sharp intelligence, are mine even if I do not deserve them. They are
mine simply because they are attached to my person in a fundamental
and intimate way, and it does not matter that my having them is in some
sense morally arbitrary. The fact that my head, with my brain in it, is
attached to my body is enough to justify title. Alternative arrangements
that authorize others to have the primary say over what is to be done to
my body and mind lead, in the vast majority of cases, to grave assaults
53. NozIcK, supra note 32, at 225.
54. For a perceptive treatment, see David Schmidtz, How to Deserve, 30 POL.
THEORY 774, 774 (2002).
55. There are multiple examples that illustrate this point. To my knowledge, this
fallacy by Rawls was first detected by Robert Nozick. See NozIcK, supra note 32, at
225-27. In my view, Nozick there definitively laid to rest Rawls's claim that natural
assets should be collectively owned. See also Miller, supra note 36, at 278; Douglas B.
Rasmussen, Liberalism and Natural End Ethics, 27 AM. PHIL. Q. 153, 158-59 (1990).
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on human dignity.56 Institutional arrangements that give others title to
my natural assets are akin to slavery. Each person is the morally rightful
owner of himself because the contrary view clashes with our intuitions
against slavery and domination.
57
Moreover, those who deny self-ownership of talents, and the Lockean
extension of self-ownership to ownership of external goods, assume an
unquestioned power of the state to redistribute everything. That is, they
apply what I call here the "Collectivist Default Rule." First, they
question the self-ownership premise by providing counter examples where
the cost of invading someone's body or mind is minimal compared to the
benefits. They then conclude that, because I cannot invoke self-ownership,
the state in principle can take my natural assets-as well as my land, my
income, and anything else I can hold-and give them to somebody who
needs them more than I do.58 However, such a conclusion does not follow:
An additional argument is needed to show that the state's right to
appropriate anything is the default rule. Perhaps I cannot claim ownership
of anything, but it does not follow that others can, and it does not follow
that the state should.59  Moreover, the Collectivist Default Rule-the
rule that says that people do not really own anything, so let us have the
state take things away-overlooks government failure.60 Even if it might be
an ideal practice for the government to take things away from those who
hold them in order to further the common good, governmental institutions
often fail. It is an open question, in those cases, whether empowering
the failure-prone government is a better solution than returning to self-
ownership and strong Lockean rights. The appropriate inquiry is
whether it is preferable to assign title over my natural assets to me, or to
assign it to others or to the state. Even accepting that the self-ownership
56. Perhaps there is no more fundamental justification to be had for self-
ownership. Perhaps self-ownership is derivative of other principles, but it is no less
important for that reason. The central point of self-ownership is simply to establish
barriers to bodily invasions by others. Because I am concerned with the morality of
actual institutional arrangements, I need not address the fancy counterexamples imagined
by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen. Among the counterfactuals used by Lippert-Rasmussen
are a world in which half the population is blind and the other half consists of people
with two regular eyes as well as a spare pair lodged in their shoulder, and a world where
persons are just Cartesian minds with artificial limbs. See Lippert-Rasmussen, supra
note 39, at 96-99, 110-15. My use of self-ownership in this Article is for real world
persons. In that sense, I accept Lippert-Rasmussen's point that the moral strength of
self-ownership is dependent on contingent facts about human life.
57. G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and Equality, in JUSTICE AND
EQUALITY HERE AND NOW 108, 109 (Frank S. Lucash ed., 1986).
58. See Lippert-Rasmussen, supra note 39, at 98-99.
59. This was demonstrated by Fred Miller, Jr. a long time ago. See Miller, supra
note 36, at 278-79.
60. GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GORDON L. BRADY, GOVERNMENT
FAILURE: APRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 133-34, 149-50(2002).
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premise does not hold in all possible worlds, establishing institutions
which deny self-ownership is morally problematic.
It is even strange to talk about one's body as an undeserved body,
although we sometimes do it.6 1 The claim that my natural assets, as
opposed to worldly resources, are mine even if I do not deserve them
was uncontroversial in the liberal literature before Rawls, and this may
be the reason why classical writers did not think they needed to argue for
it; it was self evident. Likewise, modem writers as diverse as Michael
Otsuka and G. A. Cohen agree that inequality of talents is far less
objectionable than inequality in the access to worldly resources. 2
Rawls's view, then, is a radical departure from the liberal tradition. Robust
property in one's person is the better view under a liberal political theory
that prizes autonomy and human dignity. The contrary view, that society
owns persons' talents, entails a subordination of the individual to the state.
Society's ownership of natural assets does not sit well with a liberal
conception of society. To be sure, the view that society owns natural
assets is not necessarily incompatible with respecting many choices that
people make regarding their natural talents. But typically, proponents of
the social ownership of talents claim that people are allowed those choices
for instrumental reasons, namely, that using their talents productively
helps others, especially the worse off. In contrast, the view defended
here is that self-ownership has intrinsic, and not just instrumental, moral
weight, and that using state coercion to interfere with self-ownership
requires a much stronger justification than the justification needed to
interfere with ownership of external things.
The position taken here therefore contrasts with the view defended by
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel in their influential treatment of the
philosophy of taxation.63 According to Murphy and Nagel, people do
not own anything independently of what justice says their fair share64
of income should be . Murphy and Nagel especially take issue with the
view that government needs a special justification to take what people
have earned through their labor.6 5 To them, this view presupposes a
61. For example, "Why does Pavarotti have such a beautiful voice? He does not
deserve it! Why not me?"
62. See G. A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 71 (1995);
OTSU-KA, supra note 32, at 21.
63. MURPHY &NAGEL, supra note 37, at 66, 68.
64. This is the central argument of the book. See especially id. at 74-75 (asserting
that property rights are entirely conventional).
65. Id. at 75 (explaining that what someone is entitled to through his labor is not a
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naive libertarianism: What I have earned is initially and presumptively
mine, and the government needs a good reason to tax me. To be sure,
Murphy and Nagel do not support an unlimited state power to confiscate
people's incomes. But again, their reason for this belief is purely
instrumental, as it is for Rawls: Society must establish good incentives
for wealth creation, and markets have virtues after all.66 But if confiscating
people's incomes would not affect incentives to create wealth and would
allow the government to implement social justice, then there would be
no philosophical objection to the confiscation.67
In contrast, this Article argues against society's ownership of natural
assets through reliance on moral intuitions about personal identity and
autonomy-about what it is to be a person. Whatever else I am
obligated morally to share with others, I have a stringent moral right to
exclude others from my mind and body. Thus, Kant, in his Doctrine of
Right, takes for granted a man's quality of being his own master without
discussing those concepts, perhaps because this could not possibly be
controversial: Our natural assets are intimately tied to our personal identity
in a way our external possessions, such as land, are not.68 Accordingly,
Kant devotes part of his treatise to explaining acquisition over external
things.69 He argues that there is something problematic about dispossessing
function of the voluntary agreement between employer and employee, but entirely a
function of the legitimacy of the system).
66. In their discussion of the market economy, see id. at 66-73, Murphy and Nagel
downplay the moral arguments for free markets and conclude that "the most important
function of a market economy in any conception of justice is not as an end in itself, but
as a means to the encouragement of production and the generation of wealth." Id. at 69.
67. Interestingly, as Nozick shows, scholars who deny individual ownership of
natural talents on the grounds that they are morally arbitrary do not object to allowing
greater holdings to some for equally arbitrary reasons. See NozIcK, supra note 32, at
217.
68. To be sure, Kant is unclear about self-ownership. Kant writes that "someone
can be his own master (sui iuris) but cannot be the owner of himself." ImmANumL KANT,
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 56 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1996) (1797). No one can be sure, but my reading of this passage is that Kant dislikes
talk about ownership of persons. He prefers to describe our command of our natural
assets in terms of self-mastery, that is, rational agency. But what he means by self-
mastery means the same as self-ownership for the purposes in the text, although perhaps
not for other issues like self-debasement. I am indebted to Doug Rasmussen for pressing
me to solve this puzzle.
69. For an extensive discussion of Kant's theory of property supporting the view in
the text, see B. Sharon Byrd & Joachim Hruschka, The Natural Law Duty to Recognize
Private Property Ownership: Kant's Theory of Property in His Doctrine of Right, 56 U.
TORONTO L.J. 217, 218-29 (2006). Despite textual ambiguity, Kant commentators
assume Kant's endorsement of something like Lockean self-ownership-although he
refuses to call it that because he rejects the idea of owning persons. Kant scholars
assume that Kant accepts self-mastery when they discuss Kant's rejection of Locke's
theory of labor. Under this interpretation of Kant, we are our own masters but from that
we cannot infer acquisition of external things. See, e.g., KATRIN FLIKSCHUT, KANT AND
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someone of a thing acquired in accordance with the laws that govern in
the "civil condition. '° For, as Arthur Ripstein explains, trespassers
substitute their ends regarding the thing in question-a house, for example-
for the owner's ends.71 This Kantian reasoning applies with more force
to my person, both physical and mental. For the state to decide what I
am supposed to do with my talents is to debase my humanity. I am my
own master, even if, for Kant, I cannot possibly own myself If this is
correct, the state's appropriation of talent-generated income raises a
moral worry, and not just a worry about incentives.
In conclusion, assuming arguendo that world resources were initially
owned in common and that the Lockean proviso cannot obtain, there is a
colorable argument that society can tax the income generated by the part
of those resources that I now hold, on the theory that I owe compensation to
the co-owners. My natural assets, however, were never part of the commons.
Therefore, I owe nothing to others on account of my natural assets
because at no time were others co-owners. As a result, the state cannot
legitimately tax my talent-generated income for purposes of compensation
or redistribution. The state can only tax talent-generated income to the
extent necessary to provide genuine public goods.
V. SELF-OWNERSHIP AND BRAIN DRAIN
The consequence of the principle of self-ownership for brain drain is
straightforward. If the emigrant owns his talents, the claim by the state
that the emigrant is acting objectionably is correspondingly weaker.
Unlike property over external things, arguably, ownership over natural
assets is pre-political. Assuming material things were originally owned
in common, property over them is the result of the social contract however
conceived, whether one endorses the first-appropriation principle or
some other form of initial allocation of resources. In contrast, property
over my natural assets is temporally and conceptually linked to personhood.
The state has the power, at best, to appropriate part of my external things
in order to compensate those who were harmed by my taking those
things from the commons. The state may also have the power to
appropriate the income-generated talent that would be necessary to pay
MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 118-19 (2000).
70. KANT, supra note 68, at 89.
71. See Arthur Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 2, 24
(2004).
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for the provision of public goods. But the state cannot appropriate that
income to compensate others, because I have not taken my natural assets
from the commons. And from this it follows that the state has nothing to
say, morally, about my decision to take my talents-my decision of taking
myself, really-elsewhere. Others may perhaps validly object to my
taking things from society without paying my dues, but they hardly have
a claim against taking my mind and body with me.
Someone may object that although talented persons have a right to exit
and the state cannot validly stop them, they could choose to stay and
share their skills with those of their fellow citizens who need them.
Surely that choice is morally better, because their decision to leave-if
we follow the economic literature-is motivated by their desire to
improve their earnings. The decision to leave is a selfish one, while the
decision to stay is altruistic because of the opportunity cost they are
incurring.
There is a kernel of truth in this objection.72 Whether someone acts
morally will depend on all the circumstances, and two alternative examples
illustrate this point. The first scenario is a typical one. A talented scientist
in a developing country receives no support, public or private, for her
research. She cannot pursue her scientific interests under those conditions.
In addition, the ineffectual populist policies pursued by her native government
have plunged the country into poverty and stagnation. Crime is rampant,
and the scientist does not feel that her family is safe anymore. She then
accepts an offer to work at a British university with good compensation
and appropriate working conditions. In my view, far from acting immorally,
this person is doing a good deed. She is not only following her self-
interest, but she is also making the decision that will enable her to
benefit a larger number of people. Once we reject the political claim
by the state, there is no residual moral claim that the state can press.
Now consider a very different and arguably less typical scenario. A
talented surgeon in a developing country affected by an epidemic is
practicing as part of a program for the alleviation and eradication of the
disease. He is not at risk, and his compensation, while not particularly
high, is adequate for him and his family. His team's contribution to the
eradication of the epidemic is significant, and he would be hard to
replace in the short term. He then accepts a lucrative offer from a clinic
in Beverly Hills that specializes in cosmetic plastic surgery. Arguably,
this person is morally blameworthy. Yet the important point here is that
while the person may be acting objectionably, the state has nothing to
say about his behavior. He is, at worst, morally at fault toward other
72. On this point I am indebted to Matt Zwolinski.
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persons, namely his patients. But the principles of justice that the state is
entitled to enforce do not include making his exit harder or impossible.
These two examples show that whether the emigrant acts objectionably
cannot be established in general terms. We need to look at all the
circumstances. What we can say is that the fact that the emigrant owns
her talents raises the bar for moral criticism. It is her life, after all. Even
so, sometimes an emigrant's decision to leave will be morally neutral,
other times it will be morally blameworthy, and yet other times it will be
morally praiseworthy. But the important point here is that any moral
evaluation of the emigrant's behavior will draw on common morality,
and not on the supposed collective ownership of talents.
Moreover, under a plausible theory of justice, it is far from clear that
the emigrant is failing to help those who deserve help by going to
greener pastures, rather than by staying. Although this is an empirical
question, common sense tells us that the talented person will perform
better under better conditions, and thus will be more likely to maximize
whatever benefits he provides to others. And the fact that the emigrant
acts in self-interest does not blight the correctness of the action. If one's
leaving is beneficial to most people, especially the world's poor, then it
is a good decision regardless of intent•.7  Likewise, if the brain drain
phenomenon is beneficial to most people, especially the world's poor,
then it is desirable, regardless of private motivations.
VI. LEAVING HoME
Thus far, this Article has argued that the state does not own a person's
talents, and that there is a significant moral difference between society's
claim to someone else's external things and society's claim to someone's
talents. It has suggested that the state may, at most, tax people's talent-
generated income to pay for the provision of genuine public goods, and
no more. However, for the sake of argument, let us concede that the
state has a power to tax the income generated by natural assets in order
to realize social justice, and not just to pay for the provision of public
goods. Even then there is no plausible moral argument for criticizing
73. Thus, free trade is morally defensible because it is good for people, including
the poor, notwithstanding the fact that agents are self-interested. See Fernando R. Teson
& Jonathan Klick, Global Justice and Trade: A Puzzling Omission 2-4 (FSU College of
Law, Law and Economics Paper No. 07-24, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id = 1022996.
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emigrants or for taxing the income that they earn abroad from using their
skills. Assuming distributive principles of justice, emigrants simply
decide to break ties with their political society and join another political
society. They will discharge their distributive duties in that new society.
Assuming a fight to exit, those left behind cannot claim that the emigrants
are breaching their duty to share with them the talent-generated income,
because the emigrants will from now on be taxed elsewhere. They will
be sharing their talent-generated income with their new compatriots, and
with the world at large, assuming that cosmopolitan duties are discharged
through foreign aid and other similar avenues. 74
In conclusion, the claim of the state to income-generated talent is
much weaker than the claim it has over external things because the right
of self-ownership is much more stringent than the right to own external
things. And even if the state has a justice-based power to tax talent-generated
income, it has no application when citizens decide to leave, because the
citizens will be discharging their distributive duties elsewhere.
VII. THE QUESTION OF HARM
The claim that the talented emigrant harms those left behind is central
to the worry about brain drain. Two questions must be addressed. First,
are those left behind really harmed? Second, even if those left behind
are harmed in some sense, is it an unjust harm that requires redress
through legal means?
Whatever harm means, it has to include the setting back of someone's
interest. 75 Critics of the brain drain assume that it harms those left behind.
Although this is an empirical question and judgments will vary in each case,
even this premise is questionable. As previously discussed, the possibility
of emigration raises the returns on education in the source country and in
many cases produces a brain gain. In addition, those left behind can
benefit from the contributions made by the emigrant elsewhere. More
importantly, from a cosmopolitan perspective, we must weigh the
benefits and harms that the brain drain causes to the world at large and
especially to the world's poor. Once we avoid a narrow nationalist focus
and expand the scope of justice, the assumption that the brain drain is
harmful is even less plausible.
Moreover, whatever harm is caused by emigration is not an unjust
harm. The most serious forms of harm that the state must prevent are
74. See infra regarding the cosmopolitan view.
75. See 1 JOEL FEINBERO, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
OTHERS 33-34 (1984).
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those with which the criminal law is concerned. 76 But, of course, it does
not follow that the state's job is to redress as many harms as possible.77
This position is absurd because most of what people do in their everyday
lives affects and often harms others. For example, if Joe decides to
marry Kirsten instead of Meredith, and Meredith loves Joe, Meredith
will be harmed because her interests would be set back. If enough
consumers decide to buy Apple computers because they judge them
better, makers of PCs will be harmed. If two persons compete for the
same job, the one who is not chosen will be harmed. Perhaps a necessary
condition for legitimate state intervention is that the setting back of an
interest be wrongful. That is, A harms B when (1) A sets back B's
interest, and (2) A does this in a manner that violates B's rights. 78 If We
apply this formula to emigration, there is no harm, because when a
doctor emigrates from Peru she is not violating the rights of those left
behind, even assuming that she is setting back the interests of those left
behind.
However, this argument is not an adequate reply to brain drain critics
because the definition of harm is noticeably narrow and intended only
for the criminal law.79 This definition of harm, the wrongful setting
back of someone's interest, is perhaps appropriate to reject exit visas,
but not necessarily other forms of control that the state may use, such as
taxation of foreign-earned income. Brain drain critics will insist that
measures to curb the brain drain, short of force, fall within permissible
state policy, such as commercial and trade policy. In order for the measure
to be justified, no strong notion of harm is needed. The government
simply judges, in good faith, that something harmful is happening and
decides to reduce the harm.
To see what is wrong with this claim, we must examine it closely.
The argument for some measure of state control, such as taxation of
foreign-earned income, would proceed in several steps. People in a
developing country presumably are not harmed if a few doctors leave.
But, if a sufficiently high number of doctors emigrate, then those left
behind are harmed. There will not be enough doctors to provide health care
in the country. The responsibility of the government is to address precisely
76. For a classic treatment, see id. at 31, 61-62.
77. Harm is understood as the setting back of an interest.
78. FEINBERG, supra note 75, at 65.
79. Feinberg expressly limits his analysis of harm to the criminal law and avoids
discussing more "subtle uses of state power" such as taxation. Id. at 3.
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these kinds of unintended consequences of otherwise permissible behavior.
Although it would not be acceptable for the state to directly interfere with
the doctors' right to leave because that would be too intrusive of liberty,
it is surely permissible for the state to raise the cost of leaving by warning
prospective emigrants that they will have to pay taxes to their native
country.
The problem with this argument is that it eviscerates an important
individual fight, namely, the freedom of movement. People have a human
right to leave their country. While acknowledging freedom of movement as
a human right, the state cannot simultaneously say that the emigration of,
for example, ten percent of doctors gives society just the fight amount of
freedom of movement it needs, so that the government can subsequently
make the exercise of the fight much harder.80 In other words, critics of the
brain drain treat it as an aggregative harm: Only when emigration
reaches a certain volume do they think the state should intervene to stem
it. Yet each person holds a fight to leave. The aggregative approach wrongly
assumes that persons are resources of the state and that the state is
therefore free to regulate their behavior when it is deemed convenient
from the standpoint of public policy. Whatever the merits of this reasoning
might be with regard to other social and economic issues, it is not
applicable to behavior that constitutes an exercise of a fundamental right.
The question boils down, then, to whether the state can permissibly interfere
with freedom of movement by making its exercise harder. Given the
importance of freedom of movement-and for the same reasons we are
suspicious of the government raising the cost of exercising our other
constitutional rights-the answer should be no. 81
VIII. THE ARGUMENT FROM RECIPROCITY
Critics of the brain drain may make a different kind of argument.
Without necessarily assuming that the state owns-in the derivative
sense previously explained-a person's talents, they may claim that
emigrants owe a duty to those left behind because of benefits that the
state has bestowed upon them. This argument, in turn, has two versions.
The specific-reciprocity argument claims that the talented citizen has
80. I borrow the example, mutatis mutandi, from RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92 (1978).
81. I would go further. Imagine that everyone wants to leave a country. Can the
government validly stop them, or dissuade them from leaving by threatening them with
future taxation? I would not think so. Rulers are mere agents of the people, and in a
sense, their legitimacy is impugned if people do not want to stay and endure their
governance.
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received specific benefits from the state, such as education.8 2 The
general-reciprocity argument claims that citizens owe associative, non-
voluntary obligations to their country.83 Under this view, citizens' talents
are the inevitable outcome of social and political institutions. People
could not develop whatever natural talents they have without those
institutions in place. This fact rebuts, they think, the atomistic premise
of self-ownership: There is nothing that an adult person can exhibit as a
purely natural asset. If this view is correct, then the prospective emigrant
owes something to those left behind.
According to the specific-reciprocity argument, society has invested in
the person's education and therefore the skilled citizen owes a corresponding
moral duty to society to use her talents for society's benefit. She needs
to give back part of what she received. The argument is quasi-contractual in
nature: The skilled citizen has received something from her fellow
citizens who paid for her education; therefore, she has a moral duty to
use her talents for their benefit.
But this argument wrongly transposes principles of private contract
into the political relationship between government and citizens. Because
developing countries have few private schools and universities, the
typical person is educated in the public schools and public universities.
Usually the person who wants to learn in a developing country has only
one option, namely, public education. Because the government forces
taxpayers to subsidize public education, the transaction is involuntary
with regard to both parties. The student does not have a choice about
where to get an education, and the taxpayers do not have a choice
either. It is dubious, to say the least, that these facts generate an obligation
to give back to the country. More generally, the argument that a person
has a duty of reciprocity only because they have received a benefit is
open to question. To be sure, some political theorists do take that view.
They suggest that even if a social contract never took place, the
acceptance of benefits generates an obligation to do one's part.14 Others,
82. This is the core of the so-called "nationalist perspective" regarding the brain
drain. See, e.g., Don Patinkin, A "Nationalist" Model, in THE BRAIN DRAIN 92, 92-108
(Walter Adams ed., 1968).
83. Thus, for example, John Horton claims that political obligations are largely
nonvoluntary, much like family obligations. JOHN HORTON, POLITICAL OBLIGATION 146,
150 (1992). Under this view, the citizen owes, perhaps, a duty to give back to her
country which is not grounded in any specific benefits she may have received.
84. Most famous is H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV.
175,185 (1955). See also RAWLS, supra note 45, at 97.
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however, have replied that "it is wrong to feel obliged to those who foist
upon us benefits for which we have not asked. 8 5 In fact, this principle-
sometimes called the "principle of fairness"-is highly objectionable, as
Robert Nozick has shown.86 The fact that others have, without my
consent, engaged in activities from which I benefit surely does not create
an obligation on me, especially if I have not agreed, if I have no say on
what others decide to do, and if I sometimes even have no control over
whether I receive the benefit or not.8 7  And to think about such
obligation as enforceable, perhaps in the name of preventing free riding,
is even more objectionable.88
The general-reciprocity argument holds that we are who we are, not
because we possess pristine natural assets, but because social and
political institutions have shaped us into our present beings.8 9 For
example, a medical doctor benefited from the fact that her parents, also
distinguished professionals, thrived under the political status and social
recognition accorded to professionals; that social advantage accrued to
their child. The medical doctor cannot, then, claim that her talents are
natural. Therefore, she owes something to the society that nurtured her.
On one level, this argument is tautological. We are all born into some
social and political context. Does this mean that we always owe something
to society, such as taxes, simply because that society was in place when
we came to the world? 90 The more appropriate question hinges on what
normative consequences follow from the fact that we are born into a pre-
existing political setting. The answer to this question by those who endorse
the "socially-constituted" argument is never clear, but presumably they
would endorse strong taxation of talent-generated income without worrying
that the person has earned that income with his natural assets, because
the assets are not really his but are socially-constituted. Presumably, under
this view, there is no difference between worldly goods and natural
assets. I own land only thanks to the political institutions in place, 91 and
I play the piano well also thanks to the political institutions in place.
85. Jean Hampton, Social Contract, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY
745, 746 (Robert Audi ed., 1995).
86. See NOzlCK, supra note 32, at 90-95.
87. One may lack control over receiving the benefit either because one cannot help
getting the benefit or because one faces dire alternatives.
88. See NozICK, supra note 32, at 95.
89. Sometimes this view is described as "social constructionism." For a review of
that position, see Ian Hacking, Are you a Social Constructionist?, LINGUA FRANCA,
May/June 1999, at 65-72.
90. When I say something, I am not thinking about owing obedience to the law and
similar duties. Instead, I mean something extra for the fact that the state nurtured me.
91. Notice that this is Murphy and Nagel's claim. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra
note 37, at 8.
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This argument attaches no significance to the fact that one's talents
attached to one's body and were never taken from the commons.
To the extent that the argument is not just an empty tautology, it must
be rejected. Using the example of a medical doctor again, let us concede
that what she has now is in part the result of benefits she received from
society. She could not be who she is but for those benefits. If this is so,
either she received those benefits from public institutions or from private
institutions. If the former is true, Nozick's argument, discussed above,
applies: She does not incur obligation for benefits that were foisted on
her by the state.92 If, on the other hand, she received those benefits from
a private institution, either she paid for those or she did not. If she did,
there is no residual obligation to society. Political institutions are set up
in part to regulate and enforce contracts, including the provision of
services such as private medical education. If I bought something from
you, I owe you the price. I do not owe you the price plus something else
to society. Someone may object at this point that I owe something else
to society, namely, a tax to finance the cost of those institutions that
facilitate exchange.93 But this is not the argument made here. The
argument is that I owe that, plus an extra obligation arising from the fact
that the state nurtured me. In particular, I have to pay those left behind
if I decide to leave. As previously argued, that extra compensation is
inappropriate because-assuming the relevant causal connection-the
benefits were bestowed coercively.
If, on the other hand, one has received private benefits for which one
has not paid, then one owes that money to the benefit provider. Thus,
the doctor owes medical school loans. But again, the general-reciprocity
argument claims that one owes that, plus something else on account of
political institutions, and there is no justification for such a duplication
of debts. The same objection holds if the successful person, as is often
the case, has received most of the relevant benefits-those that arguably
determine her present success-from her family. Here, it is even harder
to argue that she owes something to society above and beyond her filial
obligations .
92. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
93. I have already conceded this by recognizing the taxing power of the state to
finance genuine public goods.
94. The general-reciprocity argument here is particularly weak given the "natural"
quality of family, but I do not pursue that line of argument here.
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Moreover, the argument that prospective emigrants owe something to
those left behind because the emigrants benefited from political institutions
sounds strange when applied to the brain drain phenomenon. It is well
established that good institutions are crucial for growth and prosperity.95
If this is correct, under the view we are discussing, the emigrants owe
something to their society if it provided reasonable institutions. Yet
people often leave because their native institutions are deficient. Arguably,
in many of those countries, people develop their talents despite the political
institutions, not because of them, as the argument assumes. The argument
we are considering is forced to hold that the better the institutions left
behind, the stronger the emigrants' duties. Thus, a German doctor
who emigrates to the United States is allegedly doing something worse
than the Ghanian doctor who emigrates to the United States because the
German doctor, unlike the Ghanian doctor, is leaving good political
institutions who nurtured the doctor well. Notably, this claim clashes with
the intuition that brain drain from poor countries is objectionable. The
paradox is this: If the general-reciprocity argument is sound, then it
should praise people who leave societies with bad institutions. Because
if many countries are poor as the result of bad institutions, then there is
nothing wrong with leaving those countries. However, this conclusion is
precisely the opposite corollary to the one that the argument was supposed
to endorse. This dissonance occurs because the criticism of the brain
drain trades on some vague notion of international justice that regrets the
loss of human capital that poor countries suffer for the benefit of rich
countries. This notion, right or wrong, is at odds with the general-reciprocity
argument.
Another problem with this argument, in any of its forms, is that it is
hard to see why it applies only across national borders. No one objects
if a doctor educated at Florida State University moves to California.
Yet, under the reciprocity rationale, the doctor would have a duty to
practice medicine in Florida because his education was subsidized by
Floridians, and Florida has its own political institutions that nurtured the
doctor's talents. Someone could object that the doctor's move is acceptable
because he does not harm the people of Florida. But there is often harm
95. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND EcoNoMIc
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 186 (June Abbott trans., 1989); Daron Acemoglu et
al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,
91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1369 (2001); Dani Rodrik et al., Institutions Rule: The
Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9
J. ECON. GROWTH 131, 132 (2004). See also The World Bank, Documents and
Reports, http://go.worldbank.org/GOKQ7UO9B0/, for the works of leading governance
and development researcher Daniel Kaufmann.
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in the relevant sense. People leave economically depressed areas to move
to other parts of the country, and although those left behind deplore it,
no one claims that the local authorities should make emigration hard or
impossible, as some claim for international migration of talent. Also, the
argument's rationale is reciprocity, not harm. Under this rationale, the
doctor owes Floridians a debt. Although relevant, harm beyond the harm of
breach is not central to the argument.
Finally, there is a sad truth about brain drain, already anticipated in the
foregoing discussion, which makes reciprocity inapplicable in many
cases. All too often, the governments of developing countries do not
discharge their justice-based duties with the taxes they collect.96 Some
of those regimes are outright oppressive, others are simply "kleptocracies"
without being otherwise oppressive, and others are just disorganized,
corrupt, and inefficient.97 More often than not, governments in developing
countries mistreat their talented citizens in various ways.98 Wage differential
is certainly a major reason for the brain drain, but wage differential
exists for a reason. Government failure should not be overlooked as
major cause. Poor political and social conditions diminish the returns
that talented persons can expect, and those facts are hardly facts of
nature. This stagnation is often the result of vicious circles of economic
and political depredation. 99 If this is true, at least sometimes, then emigrants'
present skills can hardly be credited to their political environment. In
fact, they often perform a good deed by leaving, not only because they
are escaping mistreatment, but also because they will be more likely to
make valuable contributions with their talents in a society that does not
96. For a full picture of the gravity of the issue, see the statistics compiled by
Transparency International, which are available at http://www.transparency.org/.
According to this global coalition against corruption, "[p]ersistently high corruption in
low-income countries amounts to an 'ongoing humanitarian disaster."' Press Release,
Transparency International, Persistently High Corruption in Low-Income Countries Amounts
to an "Ongoing Humanitarian Disaster" (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.transparency.
org/news room/latest news/press releases/2008/2008 09 23 cpi 2008 en.
97. A "kleptocracy" is a government that, while it does not politically oppress its
citizens, it steals from them. For the case of Argentina, see CARLOS S. NINO, UN PAis AL
MARGEN DE LA LEY: ESTUDIO DE LA ANOMIA COMO COVPONENTE DEL SUBDESARROLLO
ARGENTINO (1992).
98. For political mistreatment, see the statistics and rankings in Freedom House,
Freedom in the World (2008), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&
year=2008.
99. See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 95, at 3 (supporting the widely held view that
economic stagnation is mainly due to bad institutions).
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exploit them. Moreover, emigrants will often make a better contribution
to their country of origin working in a better place. 10 0
There is, then, a curious paradox here: Critics of the brain drain
purport to support developing countries, but they overlook the fact that
the governments of those countries are often the most oppressive,
corrupt, and inept. The assumption in literature critical of the brain drain
is that governments in developing countries are acting in good faith,
trying to get ahead. Yet, in actuality, many of those governments are
among the worst violators of human rights and they also often adopt
populist and demagogic policies with disastrous results. That is what
causes the brain drain, not predatory practices from the rich countries.
Developing countries need to improve their institutions and practices if
they aspire to keep their talented citizens. Certainly any complaint about
brain drain requires them to have clean hands in the first place.
IX. NATIONALIST OR COSMOPOLITAN DUTIES?
Even assuming that talented persons have a duty to share their
income-generated talent with others, especially the least fortunate, critics
of the brain drain adopt a strangely nationalist position: The talented
citizens have a duty to stay in order to benefit their fellow citizens with
their skills. But this position collapses if one instead adopts a global
perspective. Under principles of global justice, the talented citizens have
a duty to benefit the distributively qualified world, and not just their
compatriots.10 1 If the duty is to help the world's least fortunate, then
whether or not the rightful beneficiaries are their compatriots is entirely
contingent. In fact, it is likely that the rightful beneficiaries will not be
their compatriots.
This nationalist position is conjoined with the dubious empirical
assumption that the emigrant's work helps only the receiving country.
Again, this is a corollary of the flawed view that skilled citizens are the
human capital of the state. If some of this capital migrates from state A
to state B, then that represents B's gain, because B has increased its
human capital. To be sure, there is a sense in which this is true, because
the immigrant will pay taxes in the immigrant's adoptive land. But, this
is not necessarily true of the benefits accrued from the immigrant's
talents. Take, for example, a typical case of someone who studies
physics in a developing country. He then earns a Fulbright Scholarship
to pursue his Ph.D. at a prestigious American university. After that, he
100. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
101. For purposes of this argument I assume, but do not argue for, principles of
global justice.
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decides to take an academic position in the United States, where he
settles permanently. During his career, he will teach many students and
publish academic papers. This output will not benefit just the United
States. Instead, he has contributed to knowledge that goes in the
global public domain, improves scientific understanding, and improves
the technologies based on that understanding. If one considers that, due
to lack of adequate working conditions, he could not possibly have
produced this knowledge had he stayed in his home country, then under
principles of global justice, leaving was the right thing to do. He will be
contributing to universal knowledge, not just to the local economy. He
may even end up contributing more to his home country than if he had
stayed there. Certainly, Amartya Sen's work on famines has done much
more for India than anything he could have done had he stayed there
instead of emigrating to the West to study economics with the top people
in the field.
102
X. THE RECEIVING STATE
In light of the foregoing considerations, it is hard to see why rich
countries that are hospitable to talented immigrants are acting wrongly.
First, although this is not the place to discuss a general theory of
immigration, it can be argued that any cosmopolitan theory of justice
must recommend the liberalization of immigration generally, regardless
of whether it is the immigration of skilled or unskilled workers. 103 The
receiving country is providing opportunity to the nationals of a poor
country to fully develop their talents. The possibility of emigration increases
the chances that persons, who would otherwise be trapped in a closed
society, will realize their life plans. Any liberal should be sympathetic
to that prospect. Second, as previously observed, chances are that the
talented persons will help the largest number of people, including the
world's poor, if they are allowed to work in optimal conditions. The
102. Amartya Sen, an Indian economist and philosopher, is the 1998 winner of the
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. He has taught at the universities of Harvard, Oxford,
and Cambridge, among others. For a telling autobiography, see Amartya Sen, Autobiography
(1998) http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/economics/laureates/1998/sen-autobio.html. His
major work on famines is AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAmiNms: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT
AND DEPRIVATION (1981).
103. See Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49
REV. POL. 251, 251 (1987). One need not endorse open borders to conclude, as most
scholars do, that current immigration restrictions in rich countries are problematic.
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receiving country is thus providing a valuable global service by taking
these talented immigrants and allowing them to develop their potential
and provide general publicly available benefits. Moreover, quite often,
the immigrants' work will differentially benefit their home country, especially
if they are scientists. In some cases, the receivimg country will even be savmg
the immigrants from oppression, corruption, and stagnation. Surely the fact
that many Filipino nurses in Britain have been able to improve themselves
and their families counts in any evaluation of the brain drain.104 Furthermore,
any argument that those nurses owe something to their compatriots
collapses in light of the main argument in this Article that people own
their talents in an intimate and personal way. Others have a very limited
claim on them. The charge that rich countries prey on the poor countries'
human capital is just nationalist rhetoric. Countries do not own persons,
and the supposed "preying" is a free, voluntary transaction. To the extent
that it produces a negative extemality-a harm-it is not one that should be
branded as unfair. It is the same externality that a new business causes
for a competitor. 105
XI. EVALUATION OF PROPOSALS
As this Article demonstrates, much can be said about the various
proposals that have been advanced to stem the brain drain phenomenon.
As an initial matter, all coercive measures should be rejected. Exit visas
are inconsistent with liberty for obvious reasons and should be emphatically
rejected. Other less intrusive proposals of control, such as requiring
lengthy years of medical residence before allowing doctors to leave, are
highly objectionable as well, because they grossly intrude upon individual
liberty. Bhagwati's milder proposal to tax the foreign-earned income of
the emigrant should likewise be rejected for several reasons. 10 6 First, if
we are right that society does not own the citizen's talents because self-
ownership is pre-political, then society does not have the power to tax
the citizen's talent-generated income. And the public goods exception
does not even apply when the person leaves the country. Second, whatever
tax obligations the emigrant had in accordance with justice will from
now on be discharged in the emigrant's adoptive country, so Bhagwati's
proposal amounts to unjust double taxation. And third, the rationale for
the tax collapses together with the argument from reciprocity. If the fact
104. For an overview of this issue, see James Buchan, New Opportunities: United
Kingdom Recruitment of Filipino Nurses, in THE INTERNATIONAL MIIGRATION OF HEALTH
WORKERS 47 (John Connell ed., 2008).
105. Of course, the receiving country may follow objectionable practices, such as
promising immigrants amnesty for crimes such as an enticement.
106. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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that the government subsidized a person's education does not generate a
duty of reciprocity, then collecting foreign-earned income cannot be
justified.
On the other hand, measures that are not coercive are, for that very
reason, more acceptable. Rather than trying to keep people against their
will, it is much better for the source state to address the causes of brain
drain. This can be done by pursuing better economic policies and creating
appropriate incentives for people to stay, such as providing better
salaries and better working conditions. A potentially more problematic
practice is for a state to attach conditions to the provision of education,
such as a commitment to stay or to return after state-subsidized foreign
studies. On one hand, these conditions are acceptable if genuinely voluntary.
However, the conditions are unacceptable if the state is extorting the
person, as is the case when the person has no option but to study at a
public university. Similar factors apply when a state pays for the person's
education on the condition that he return the money if he decides to leave.
If these conditions are voluntary, they may be acceptable. If they are
extortive because the person has no other place to study, they are more
questionable. Thus, whether these conditions are defensible will depend
on context.
Finally, for the reasons given in the previous section, poor countries
do not have a legitimate claim to compensation from rich countries.
Poor countries do not own their nationals and they cannot accuse rich
countries of stealing their investment. Surely the fact that rich countries
have better universities, better institutions, and better economies is not
something for which those countries should apologize. The claim that
successful countries built good institutions at the expense of the poor
countries was once fashionable, but it is generally false. There are
reasons why people seek opportunity elsewhere. Poor countries would
do well in addressing those reasons instead of blaming others for the
exodus of their disgruntled nationals.
XII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Ultimately, there is nothing objectionable about the brain drain. Societies
do not own their talented citizens. One rationale for redistributing wealth
for reasons of justice is that things were unduly appropriated from the
commons. However, this rationale does not apply to natural assets
because they were not taken from the commons. The modern liberal-
egalitarian position, according to which natural assets are collectively
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owned, must be rejected as incompatible with a liberal conception of
personhood. Additionally, global justice should favor liberalized immigration
generally. The assumption that someone who emigrates only benefits
the receiving country is simplistic and often mistaken. Liberals should
welcome the brain drain for the same reasons that they should welcome
all voluntary transnational exchange: Because it is consistent with
personal freedom, and because in the long run, it improves the lives of
more people, including those who, under an appropriate theory of
justice, we should care about.
